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AbStrAct
Comparing the Nordic countries, this article examines different combinations of permanent 
and temporary employment protection legislation, and whether such differences are reflected 
in patterns of labor market transitions. We find higher levels of transitions from unemployment 
to temporary contracts in Sweden and Finland, with lax regulation of temporary contracts 
and strict regulation of permanent contracts. Further, temporary employees are integrated 
into permanent contracts in countries with lax (Denmark) or strict (Norway) regulation of 
permanent contracts, while this is not the case in Finland and Sweden. For these countries, the 
study indicates a certain degree of labor market duality, with low mobility from temporary to 
permanent employment contracts.
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Introduction
High mobility signals possibilities for entering and leaving the labor market in ac-cordance with life course changes, while low mobility suggests few job openings for those trying to enter it (OECD, 1994). Labor market mobility may also be in-
voluntary, and to those who lose their jobs, job stability would be preferred (Kalleberg 
et al., 2000). The institutional regulation of employment protection, the ease of hiring 
and firing, is usually put at the center of discussions regarding labor market mobility. In 
order to create flexibility for firms, several countries have reformed their employment 
protection legislation (EPL), usually by making it easier to hire employees temporarily 
(Skedinger, 2010). There is a rather uniform agreement that temporary jobs are inferior 
to permanent jobs, both concerning job content and job security (Booth et al., 2002; 
Kalleberg et al., 2000). Combining strict regulations of open-ended contracts with lax 
regulations of temporary contracts has by some been understood as a dual pathway to a 
flexible labor market, with safe, well-off permanent employees and a share of unsecure 
temporary employees providing numerical flexibility for firms. Others understand it as 
providing a bridge into a more permanent position in the labor market (Atkinson, 1984; 
Booth et al., 2002; Gash, 2008; Giesecke and Groß, 2003; Polavieja, 2006; Palier and 
Thelen, 2010). 
The aim of this article is to examine the relationship between labor market mobility 
and EPL. Comparing the Nordic countries, known for relatively high levels of mobility 
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(Muffels and Luijkx, 2008; OECD, 2004), and taking their regulatory combinations of 
permanent and temporary contracts as a point of departure, we consider whether these 
differences are reflected in patterns of labor market transitions. While the strictness of 
the overall EPL is thought to influence the transition patterns into the labor market, lax 
regulation of temporary contracts are by some thought to provide unemployed individu-
als a bridge into labor markets with strict regulation of permanent contracts, later inte-
grating them into the standard, permanent employment contract. The article therefore 
investigate whether different regulatory combinations influence unemployed individuals’ 
probability of getting employment through permanent or temporary job contracts, and 
further whether those temporarily employed stay employed through a temporary or per-
manent contract, or become unemployed, hence creating a dual labor market. The study 
has been made possible through pooling the labor force survey (LFS) for these countries 
for the years 2000–2006.
While there are within-country studies focusing on the consequences of different 
combinations of temporary and permanent employment contract regulation, there are 
few comparative studies. Those which exist often compare countries originating in dif-
ferent welfare state nexuses with rather large differences also regarding their industrial 
relation (IR) systems, unemployment benefit (UB) system, use of active labor market 
policies, educational systems etc., possibly influencing the consequences EPL institutions 
have on these transitions. In order to better grasp the influence that EPL might have 
on the labor markets’ ability to integrate workers into permanent contracts, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden are compared. These countries share similarities in a range 
of areas (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Magnusson et al., 2008), but show marked differences 
regarding regulation of permanent and temporary employment contracts. 
The OECD EPL index is a much used measure when comparing regulatory strict-
ness across countries (Skedinger, 2010). The index on permanent contracts quantifies (1) 
procedural inconveniences faced by the employers when initiating the dismissal process, 
such as notification and consultation requirements; (2) notice periods and severance pay 
requriements; and (3) difficulty of dismissals, such as the circumstances in which it is pos-
sible to dismiss workers and the consequences if a dismissal is later found to be unfair. 
The index on temporary contracts quantifies (1) regulation on fixed-term and temporary 
work agencies contracts, such as the work for which these contracts are allowed, and their 
duration; (2) the regulation governing temporary work agencies; and (3) requirements for 
agency workers to receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent workers in the 
user firm (Venn, 2009: 6).
According to the index, ranging from 0 to 6 with 6 being the strictest, Denmark had 
a liberal legislation on both temporary and permanent contracts, not only compared 
with the other Nordic countries but also relative to other OECD countries (OECD 
mean represented by dotted lines) (Figure 1). Norway had strict regulation on tempo-
rary employment and quite strict regulations of permanent contracts, while Sweden 
had a rather slack regulation on temporary employment and the strictest regulation 
of permanent contracts. While these countries represent different institutional com-
binations, Finland is placed somewhat in between, near the OECD mean (Figure 1). 
The comparison thus allows us to study the link between these countries’ institutional 
arrangements regarding EPL and the structure of their labor market transitions. 
This article is organized as follows: first, a discussion on EPL and the possible 
connections between these institutions and entry into, and integration in, the labor 
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market, is presented. The discussion and the country differences further leads into some 
expectations. Second, the challenges and difficulties faced when making a cross-country 
analysis of this sort is discussed. We then describe the data and methods to be used 
in the analysis. Fourth, we present the results with controls for country differences. 
Finally, the results and their implications for the understanding of such regulations are 
discussed. 
Labor market mobility and employment protection regulation 
While neoclassical economics perceive the (ideal) labor market as free and unregu-
lated, and employment contracts between employers and employees as beneficial for 
both parties, public regulations and collective agreements structure the use and con-
tent of employment contracts in real-life labor markets (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 
2000b; Rubery and Grimshaw, 2003). Differences in the strictness of EPL between 
countries may lead to differences in labor mobility from unemployment to permanent 
or temporary employment, and in the integration of temporary employees into perma-
nent contracts (Chung, 2005; Gash, 2008; Giesecke and Groß, 2003). The regulation 
of permanent and temporary contracts can be combined in three ways. 
First, both permanent and temporary contracts can be laxly regulated. With 
lax regulation of permanent contracts, the employers’ need for temporary employees is 
Note:  There were only few changes in the OECD index for these countries during the period 2000–2007 (Venn, 2009). 
The dotted lines represent the OECD mean. The Figure was changed October 2013. Some of the figures had unfortu-
nately been mixed up. The change does not influence the content of the article in any way.
Figure 1: Regulation of permanent and temporary employment in the Nordic countries: OECD 
index 2005. 
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reduced, as “permanent” contracts are flexible for employers (Chung, 2005: 37). While 
this implies high mobility and high use of permanent contracts, there is a limit to how 
lax the regulation can be. Commitment, trust, cooperation and long-term horizon are 
often important in the employer–employee relationship, and to stimulate this in coun-
tries with lax regulations, companies may initiate in-house regulations on seniority or 
severance pay, while other hidden rigidities may be anchored in collective agreements at 
various levels (Edlund and Grönlund, 2008; Esping-Andersen, 2000: 71; Jensen, 2011; 
Regini, 2000: 23).
Second, lax regulations imply unstable employment relations, thus low job and in-
come security (Burroni and Keune, 2011; Howell et al., 2007; Ozaki, 1999). In order 
to balance employer flexibility against job and income security, both permanent and 
temporary contracts can be strictly regulated. According to economic theories, strict 
EPL in labor markets with wage floors will reduce employers’ ability to lay off workers 
and their incentives to employ new or more workers (Lazear, 1990), resulting in lower 
mobility and fewer opportunities for those trying to enter the labor market (Bentolila 
and Bertola, 1990; Gangl, 2003). As lower employer flexibility increases the hiring 
risks, such a combination may reduce the opportunities for those with marginal labor 
market connection. Research indicates that strong EPL increases the unemployment 
level for youth, immigrants, and women (Bertola et al., 2007; Esping-Andersen, 2000; 
Feldmann, 2003; Heckman and Pages, 2000; OECD, 2004, 2008). As a response to high 
unemployment in some European labor markets, and to address the expected lower 
mobility in the labor market, some argue that strictly regulated labor markets should be 
deregulated, in line with the lax regulation mode (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000a). 
Still, research on EPL stringency shows no impact on the overall unemployment level 
(Esping-Andersen, 2000; Heckman, 2007; Howell et al., 2007; OECD, 2008). Further, 
a comparison of mobility from unemployment to employment in the Nordic countries, 
using the same data as this article, finds that the transition rates from unemployment to 
employment (temporary or permanent) are highest in Norway, followed by Denmark, 
Sweden, and Finland (Berglund and Furåker, 2011). Explaining results that oppose the 
neoclassical economic view, Regini (2000: 23) points to the fact that there traditionally 
exists “hidden flexibilities” alongside strict official regulations, where actors negotiate 
more flexible solutions to hiring and firing issues on firm or industry level. For instance, 
a case study of labor adjustments in manufacturing companies in the Nordic countries 
after the economic crisis of mid-2008 (Svalund et al., 2013) finds that the local parties in 
Norway and Sweden negotiated solutions that enabled more flexible adjustments than 
stated in the formal regulations, showing a certain level of discretion when applying the 
dismissal regulations. Therefore, strict labor markets may still provide high mobility 
and employment possibilities. Contrary to lax regulation, such a combination implies a 
low probability of a transition from unemployment to employment through temporary 
employment. Further, as in the third regulatory mode (see below), temporary contracts 
may integrate temporary employees into standard contracts or lead to segmented labor 
markets on a limited scale (due to the restrictions on the use of temporary employees).
Third, as relaxing the regulations on permanent contracts faces employee opposition 
in numerous European labor markets, another way to relax the EPL is to combine strict 
regulations of permanent contracts with lax regulations of temporary contracts (partial 
deregulation). Lenient regulation of temporary contracts may provide employers the pos-
sibility of adjusting personnel needs to economic fluctuations or changes in technology and 
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production, while offering unemployed individuals a bridge (Gash, 2008) into the labor 
market, possibly integrating them on a longer term (Giesecke and Groß, 2003). Hence, tem-
porary contracts can function as a probationary contract where the employers in practice 
screen employees before offering a permanent contract (Booth et al., 2002; Gash, 2008), 
thus reducing hiring risks. While proponents of this combination claim that the entry of 
unemployed through temporary contracts, and the integration of temporary employees 
into permanent contracts in the longer run, does not lead to labor market segmentation 
or dualism, critics claim it does. Segmentation and dualism theories (Boje, 1986; Hodson 
and Kaufman, 1982; Kalleberg and Sørensen, 1979) predict clear differences between core 
and periphery segments, here by way of employment contract. Type-of-contract segmenta-
tion theory (Gash, 2008; Giesecke and Groß, 2003; Polavieja, 2003) asserts that while the 
insiders have permanent contracts and secure jobs, the outsiders have temporary contracts 
and insecure jobs. These theories predict reduced transitions from temporary to permanent 
contracts in such labor markets, and higher transitions from temporary contracts to unem-
ployment. While the core workers, with permanent contracts, have a privileged position in 
such a regulatory system, it may create incentives for firing temporary workers even when 
they are productive just to avoid them becoming insiders (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). 
There exist several within-country studies analyzing the consequences of these dif-
ferent regulatory combinations. Hagen (2003) finds that temporary work leads to per-
manent work in West Germany, while Giesecke and Groß (2003), studying Germany, 
find temporary workers more likely than permanent workers to become unemployed. 
In a Nordic context, two analyses from Norway show that a majority of temporary 
employees who stayed employed ended up on a permanent contract during a two-year 
(Nergaard, 2004) or four-year (Skollerud, 1997) period. Håkansson (2001) and Levin 
(1998), studying Sweden during the 1990s, both found that temporary employees at 
time t had a higher risk of becoming unemployed two years later compared to those 
with permanent employment, but lower risks than those unemployed at time t. Also 
Nätti (1993), studying Finland, found that temporary employment functioned as a trap 
for those previously unemployed, as every third temporary employee felt under threat 
of unemployment, compared with 9% of the permanent employees. While these studies 
show that there are some integration of temporary employees into permanent positions, 
a disadvantage of these within-country studies is that it is difficult to assess whether the 
transition rates from unemployment to permanent or temporary employment, or from 
temporary employment to further employment or unemployment, are high or low rela-
tive to other countries, perhaps with differences in labor market composition.  
There are few relevant comparative studies with individual micro-data able to 
control for differences in labor market composition. Gash (2008) had such data and 
compared Denmark (mode 1), West Germany (mode 2), France (mode 2), and the UK 
(mode 1), and investigated whether different institutional set-ups integrate temporary 
employees into the standard contract. When comparing the relative rates of transition 
from temporary employment to either permanent employment or unemployment, she 
found strong differences by country with West Germany, the strictest of these countries 
on the OECD EPL ranking, providing temporary employees the best chances of obtain-
ing a permanent contract relative to entering unemployment (Gash, 2008: 663). As such, 
an important contribution of this article will be to compare the relative transition rates 
of the Nordic countries, and their regulatory combinations, while controlling for differ-
ences in labor market composition. 
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Hypotheses
The general hypotheses that can be derived from the above discussion, where the neo-
classical idea about free, lax, and flexibly regulated labor markets is contrasted with 
a stricter regulatory mode more focused on employment security, and a combinatory 
mode where strict protection of permanent employees are combined with lax regulation 
of temporary contracts, are as follows:
Since regulation of permanent contracts is strictest in Sweden, followed by Norway, 1. 
Finland, and Denmark, the hiring risks and need for screening should follow this reg-
ulatory pattern. But as the use of temporary contracts is also regulated, the relative 
transition rates from unemployment to temporary contracts rather than permanent 
should be highest in Sweden, followed by Finland, Norway, and Denmark.
The lax regulations of permanent contracts in Denmark should reduce the hiring 2. 
risks; thus temporary contracts should mostly be used for temporary jobs, time-
limited projects, etc., increasing the probability of transitions from temporary em-
ployment to unemployment. 
Following the proponents of lax temporary regulations, there should be low a. 
transition rates from temporary contracts to unemployment, while the transition 
rates from temporary to permanent employment should be high in all coun-
tries.
Those claiming that temporary employment will lead to segmentation expect b. 
high rates of transitions from temporary employment to unemployment, or to 
temporary rather than permanent contracts, in countries where strict regula-
tion of permanent contracts are combined with lax regulation of temporary 
contracts; thus, the transition rates should be highest in Sweden, followed by 
Finland and Norway. 
comparing ePL and labor market transitions in the Nordic countries
Measuring ePL
Measuring EPL strictness nationally has some important limitations when perma-
nent and temporary contracts are regulated in a combination of law and collective 
agreements, as in the Nordic countries. While the OECD index incorporates collec-
tive agreements alongside legislation (Venn, 2009), extensive use of collective agree-
ments rather than legislation opens up for more variation in the EPL level between 
industries and workers within a country. This is especially pronounced in Denmark, 
where white-collar workers are covered by the Law on Salaried Employees (Funk-
tionærloven) or collective agreements with terms fairly equal to the law, stipulating 
stricter terms than among workers, where employers generally can dismiss easily, 
without much advance notification (Berglund et al., 2010: 229–238; Jensen, 2011: 
276). Therefore, as all comparative analysis, quantifying and comparing across coun-
tries reduces complexity. Even though the index is a crude measure, it does provide 
an important assesment refined over years, and there are no comparative indicator 
that is considered better.
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Institutional differences that might influence mobility patterns
This comparison is based on a “most similar” design (Ragin, 1987: 48), where the 
cases are rather similar in all but some few respects. Still, there are important differ-
ences between the countries that might influence the mobility patterns. Consequent-
ly, we should be cautious to interpret between-country differences in labor market 
outcomes solely to EPL differences. Differences in institutional structures related 
to the labor market, such as UB, as well as the educational and pension systems, 
may influence the supply of labor moving into and out of temporary and permanent 
employment. 
A generous UB may reduce the job search intensity and make the unemployed less 
willing to accept “just any” job (OECD, 2006: 56). Unemployment insurance coverage 
is mandatory in Norway and voluntary (Ghent system) in the other Nordic countries. 
Uninsured unemployed must resort to means-tested social assistance in Sweden and 
Denmark, while there is a UB II system with benefits above the social assistance level 
in Finland (Dølvik et al., 2011), implying that search intensity for the uninsured was 
higher in Denmark and Sweden, perhaps making them more prone to accept tempo-
rary employment. There were only minor country differences in UB generosity in the 
years 2000–2006 for those insured (OECD, 2007: tables 3.1 and 3.2), where the Danish 
system was more generous on low income levels, along with Sweden, compared with 
Finland and Norway. Nickell (1997) argues that it is the duration of the UB that has an 
impact on the transition rate from unemployment to employment, since the probability 
of a transition into employment increases as unemployed persons approach the duration 
limit. The maximum duration was longest in Denmark (48 months), compared with 361 
months in Norway, 28 months in Sweden, and 24 months in Finland (Berglund et al., 
2010: 45). Summing up, the differences in the Nordic UB systems should imply that the 
mobility out of unemployment is lower in Denmark than it otherwise would have been. 
This is due to Denmark’s high level of replacement rate at low levels and the lengthy du-
ration, compared with the other Nordic countries, perhaps making insured unemployed 
less prone to accept temporary employment.
Further, while the normal retirement age is considered to be 65 years in the 
Nordic countries, there are differences between these countries regarding early retire-
ment options (Dølvik et al., 2011). At the time of the study, Denmark had an early 
retirement allowance (“after wage”), enabling workers to retire from the age of 55, 
but with lower allowance for those retiring before the age of 62 (Goul Andersen, 
2007). In Finland, the unemployed who turned 60 before the 500-day period of UB 
was over could move directly into old age pension. In Norway, a collectively agreed 
supplementary pension scheme allowed covered groups to retire at the age of 62, 
while in Sweden there was no such early retirement system. These differences may 
imply that individuals facing early retirement may transit from unemployment or 
temporary employment to a position outside the labor market, rather than to (fur-
ther) employment one year later. 
The level of unemployment, growth, or decline in employment at large may also 
affect the mobility patterns (Andersen et al., 2008; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). A 
central mechanism in labor market adjustment in the Nordic countries has been to fa-
cilitate a dynamic interplay between market competition, solidaristic wage policies, and 
active labor market policies (Barth et al., 2009; Erixon, 2010; Ibsen, 2011; Meidner 
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and Rehn, 1953; van den Berg, 2008). Less productive firms unable to match the wage 
floor defined through centralized agreements are forced out of competition, while the 
redundant workers, facilitated by public training, mobility schemes, and UBs, move into 
new jobs in more productive companies. Therefore, mobility is governed primarily by 
labor demand at the company level. High labor demand creates high mobility rates into 
employment, hence a full employment model has little room for insider–outsider labor 
markets (DiPrete et al., 2001). When labor demand is lower, the probability for reem-
ployment (job-to-job mobility) is lower, and the probability for mobility into unemploy-
ment increases. If temporary employment leads to higher mobility into unemployment, 
the transition rates should be higher in case of low labor demand. 
The unemployment and employment rates and the rate of growth in employment 
differed across the countries in the period. Finland had an unemployment rate of more 
than 10% in 2000, decreasing to below 7% in 2007, the same as Sweden in 2007. While 
Denmark had lower figures the whole period (around 5%), Norway had the lowest fig-
ures (Table 1). There were only minor differences in employment growth in these years, 
table 1  Unemployment rates, employment rates, and growth: 2000–2006. Average percentage 
points 15–64.
Unemployment Employment Share of temporary employees Employment growth
Denmark 4.7 76.1   9.5 3.4
Finland 8.8 68.1 17.2 4.6
Norway 3.8 73.0   9.8 4.3
Sweden 6.6 76.0 15.6 4.5
Source:  Eurostat (EU-LFS).
highest in the countries having the lowest employment to population ratio, and the high-
est unemployment ratio (Table 1). 
While focusing on labor market transitions (mobility), the actual level or stock of 
temporary contracts as a percentage of all employees at a given time varies between 
these countries during 2000–2006, with around 10% of all employees aged 15–64 years 
temporarily employed in Denmark and Norway, compared with approximately 16% in 
Sweden and 17% in Finland (Berglund et al., 2010: 34). Still, differences in transition 
patterns and thus the duration of the temporary contracts between countries may mean 
that the level of temporary employment and the transition rates in and out of this posi-
tion are only modestly connected.  
data and method
The data are from the LFS for the years 2000–2007 for Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
and from 2000 to 2006 in Denmark. As noted, the employment grew during these years, 
while the unemployment and employment rates showed steady changes. In the years 
after, the financial and economic shift has impacted these countries’ employment and 
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unemployment rates, as well as economic growth, with rather different strengths 
(Jochem, 2011). The article therefore concentrates on these rather stable years. The data 
consist of a representative sample of the population in these countries aged 16–63, a 
total of 420,567 persons. The respondents were all surveyed at two points in time, with 
one year between. As an example, we therefore have information about an individual’s 
labor market status the first quarter of 2000 (t) and the first quarter of 2001 (t+1). It is 
therefore possible that the individuals followed have changed status several times within 
the year, without it being recorded in the data. As the data only measure change between 
two points in time, we cannot control for individual heterogeneity as a longitudinal 
study would allow. Still, using a pooled dataset, we are able to control for compositional 
differences in the labor force, such as differences in age and gender composition, indus-
try structure, company size, or differences in economic shifts, something that has not 
been done in previous studies of the Nordic countries. While the pooled data and the 
logistic analysis do allow control for compositional and structural differences between 
these labor markets, the data and method do not provide an opportunity to separate the 
effect of EPL on its own and the effect of other (institutional) differences between these 
countries. Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate whether the mobility patterns 
in focus resemble the theoretical expectations brought forward in labor market theories, 
without claiming that all between-country variation is caused by EPL differences. 
Focusing on whether and how different combinations of EPL may influence mobil-
ity patterns from unemployment and into the labor market, Table 3 use a dependent 
variable that measures whether those unemployed at t and employed at t+1 made this 
transition into a permanent (value 0) or a temporary (value 1) contract. Investigating 
whether temporary employees become integrated into the labor market, Table 4 analyze 
whether temporary employees stay employed at t+1 or change status into unemployed. 
Table 4 also analyze transitions from permanent contracts to unemployment, compar-
ing whether high levels of transitions from temporary employment to unemployment 
influence the rate of transitions from permanent contracts to unemployment, and vice 
versa. Staying employed in a temporary or permanent contract is given the value 0, 
while a transition into unemployment is given the value 1. Finally, integrating temporary 
employees into the labor market may also mean that temporary employees get a perma-
nent contract. In Table 5 the probability that those temporarily employed at t and still 
employed at t+1 hold a temporary (value 0) rather than a permanent (value 1) contract 
is studied. 
A proportion of the population in all labor markets is not in the labor force, due to 
military service, maternity leave, child caring responsibilities, education, disability pen-
sion, etc. There are some transitions from this status to the labor market from one year 
to the next, but this group consists of individuals in very different positions. We there-
fore focus on unemployed persons, who are a more unified group that we expect tries to 
enter the labor market. Transitions from temporary employment to unemployment are 
also easier to interpret as involuntary movements, compared with forms of transitions 
into inactivity. 
Mobility rates tend to differ between different age groups, as young individuals make 
labor market transitions to a higher degree than older individuals. Comparing different 
labor markets, differences in age composition between the countries may influence the 
mobility rates (Andersen et al., 2008). Norway and Denmark have a higher proportion 
of young individuals participating in the labor market, and ceteris paribus, the mobility 
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rates can be expected to be higher. This difference may be caused, for example, by dif-
ferences in the labor demand, in the educational system, or in the possibilities of getting 
a part-time job while studying (Gangl et al., 2003; Olofsson and Wadensjö, 2007). As 
mentioned, there are also differences in the pension systems, possibly influencing the 
participation of those in the older age groups (Hult and Edlund, 2008). In order to 
avoid that such differences influence the results, we have analyzed both the whole group 
(19–63 years) and individuals in their prime labor market age (25–54 years). 
We use logistic regressions where transition rates for each country are compared 
with the Nordic mean. By comparing all the countries in one regression analysis, we are 
able to control for differences in labor markets, be it labor market composition or struc-
tural factors. We control for a range of factors: demographic variables, gender, age, area 
of origin, and education are included. In the analysis of transitions from temporary or 
permanent employment to either employed or unemployed (Table 4), and from tempo-
rary to still temporary or permanent employment at t+1 (Table 5), several variables that 
are centered on the individuals’ connection with the labor market are used. Patterns of 
mobility into temporary or permanent employment and from temporary to permanent 
employment vary between different industries. We therefore control for differences in 
composition of the industries (NACE 2 digit level), company size, occupational struc-
ture (ISCO-88 2 digit level), and working time. Structural and cyclical conditions in the 
labor market are also controlled for. Following Berglund et al. (2010), we control for 
structural factors that might affect the mobility rates through a variable that measures 
the county unemployment rates. In the analyses, the county unemployment rate variable 
is divided into high, medium, and low relative to the county mean unemployment level 
of the Nordic countries as one (see Berglund et al., chapter 4 for more details). Economic 
cycles are also controlled for through a variable that measures changes in national un-
employment levels in percent from one year to the next. 
results
Comparing country differences in distribution of the independent variables (table not 
shown here), there are mostly small differences. Worth noticing is that the variation in 
county unemployment level and change in national unemployment vary rather strongly 
across the Nordic countries, with lower levels and variation in Denmark and Norway. 
In Table 2 descriptive data on what happened to the unemployed individuals from 
one year (t) to the next (t+1) and whether they were still unemployed, had made a transi-
tion to inactivity, or were permanently or temporarily employed, are presented. Further, 
we describe whether those temporarily and permanently employed at t had changed 
status one year later and had made a transition to either permanent or temporary em-
ployment, unemployment, or inactivity. 
Table 2 reveals distinct country differences concerning the transition rates from 
unemployment at t to inactivity, permanent employment, and temporary employment 
one year later. The proportions of unemployed individuals at t who are still unemployed 
at t+1 are much higher in Finland and Sweden, compared with Denmark and especially 
Norway: 21% in the age group 19–63 years were still unemployed one year later in 
Norway, compared with 37–38% in Finland and Sweden; 59% of the unemployed at 
t make a transition into employment one year later in Norway, compared with 48% 
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in Denmark, 44% in Sweden, and 38% in Finland. As such, the mobility rates from 
unemployment to employment are much lower in Finland and Sweden, compared with 
Denmark and Norway. While unemployed in Norway and Denmark to a large part 
move into permanent employment one year later, this is not the case in Finland and 
Sweden. In those countries, a higher proportion move into temporary rather than per-
manent employment. There are few significant differences between the whole group and 
table 2  Change in employment status from one year to the next. Unemployed and temporarily 
employed at t: 19–63 and 25–54 years of age, by country, 2000–2007. Percent.
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Age group 19–63 25–54 19–63 25–54 19–63 25–54 19–63 25–54
Unemployed at t
Status at t +1
Unemployed 29.1 27.2 38.0 37.4 20.8 20.3 37.8 34.1
Inactive 23.2 17.6 23.8 19.9 20.7 19.6 18.1 17.6
Permanent employed 31.9 37.5 15.2 17.4 42.8 43.5 20.0 22.7
Temporary employed 15.8 17.7 22.9 25.3 15.6 16.6 24.2 25.6
N 4251 3178 5859 4923 1130 1008 4818 3812
Permanent employed at t
Status at t +1
Permanent employed 91.5 92.8 91.9 94 93.9 94.3 89.9 95.5
Temporary employed 2.5 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.0
Unemployed 2.3 2.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2
Inactive 4.7 2.5 4.8 2.9 4.6 2.6 2.6 1.4
N 46705 35861 79995 61947 43387 32228 93748 70124
Temporary employed at t
Status at t +1
Temporary employed 30.9 31.3 51.7 52.4 30.4 31.0 48.5 47.5
Permanent employed 44.4 46.2 26.4 27.2 54.6 55.0 34.3 36.4
Unemployed 11.8 11.3 11.3 10.8 4.6 4.7 8.0 7.5
Inactive 12.9 11.2 10.6 9.6 10.4 9.3 9.2 8.6
N 4042 3478 8917 8277 2728 2514 8400 8277
Note: The period for Denmark is 2000–2006.
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those in the prime age. A lower proportion of those in the prime age make a transition 
to inactivity in Denmark and Finland, while there are no such differences in Sweden and 
Norway. Further, a higher share of prime age individuals makes a transition to a per-
manent contract in Denmark. Finally, the total level of transitions from unemployment 
to employment, regardless of path, is much higher among prime age individuals than in 
the whole group in Denmark (6% difference) and in Finland (4% difference), compared 
with 3% difference in Sweden and 1% in Norway.
Turning to those permanently employed at t, most have the same status at t+1. 
While Sweden has the lowest stability (90%), Norway has the highest (94%). While 
just above 2% change status into temporary employment in all the Nordic countries, 
a somewhat higher share in Denmark move into unemployment, compared with the 
other Nordic countries. Further, a lower share makes a transition into inactivity in 
Sweden, compared with the other Nordic countries. Comparing the whole group 
with those in the prime employment age, the stability among those in the prime age 
is much higher in Sweden than in the whole group and compared with the prime age 
group in the other Nordic countries. Finally, Table 2 shows that the transition rate 
from permanent employment to inactivity, as could be expected, is much higher in 
the whole group. 
The mobility rates out of temporary employment are much higher in Denmark and 
Norway, compared with Finland and Sweden. The transition rate from temporary to 
permanent employment contracts is twice as high in Norway, compared with Finland. 
Instead, higher proportions stay temporarily employed in Finland and Sweden. There 
are also differences in transition rates between the Nordic countries concerning transi-
tions to unemployment. While 5% in the whole group were still unemployed at t+1 in 
Norway, 8% were unemployed in Sweden, compared with 11% in Finland and 12% 
in Denmark. A higher share move from temporary contracts to inactivity in Denmark 
compared with the other countries, while there are no differences between the whole 
group and those in the prime age. 
Pathways from unemployment to employment—through a 
permanent or a temporary contract? 
Berglund and Furåker (2011), using the same data as this article, find that the transi-
tion rates from unemployment to employment (temporary or permanent) are highest 
in Norway, followed by Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. While the level of mobility is 
important, our focus is on the pathways into the labor market. In what way do these 
go through temporary employment? Logistic regressions are used to analyze the cross-
national differences regarding the dependent variables at the center of this article. First, 
do we find country differences in the transition from unemployment to either temporary 
or permanent employment contracts in the Nordic countries? 
The probability of making a transition from unemployment at t to a permanent rather 
than temporary contract at t+1 is higher than the Nordic mean in Norway and Denmark, 
while it is lower in Sweden and Finland (Table 3). In order to rule out the influence of 
differences in the educational or retirement systems, a separate analysis for those in the 
25–54 age group has been made. The analysis shows the same general pattern for both age 
groups, but the probability of making a transition into temporary employment is lower 
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table 32  Binominal logistical regression of labor market transitions from unemployment to either 
permanent (=0) or temporary (=1) employment contracts: 2000–2007. 
  Model 1 Model 2
Age group Country (ref=  
means of odds)
b S.E. b S.E.
19–63 
Denmark –0.533*** 0.041 –0.486*** 0.045
Finland 0.644*** 0.036 0.420*** 0.049
Norway –0.690*** 0.057 –0.459*** 0.069
Sweden 0.579*** 0.037 0.525*** 0.039
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.123
N 9512
25–54 
Denmark –0.540*** 0.049 –0.515*** 0.054
Finland 0.668*** 0.045 0.469*** 0.061
Norway –0.621*** 0.072 –0.388*** 0.087
Sweden 0.493*** 0.047 0.435*** 0.049
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.130
N 6003
Note: The period for Denmark is 2000–2006. Significance probabilities for the coefficients: ***p<0.001, **p< 0.01,  
*p<0.05. 
Controls have been conducted regarding gender, age, educational level and area of origin in model 1, while we have also 
controlled for relative county unemployment levels and annual national changes in unemployment levels in model 2. 
in Finland and Denmark in model 2 than for the whole group. The main picture in Table 
3 is that the probability of making a transition from unemployment to employment via 
a temporary contract is higher than the Nordic mean in Sweden and Finland, while it is 
lower in Denmark and Norway.
Integrating temporary employees—temporary and permanent 
employees’ probability of staying employed
To investigate whether temporary employees become integrated in the labor market, logis-
tic regressions are used to analyze the cross-national differences in the transition rates from 
temporary employment to either staying employed or changing status to unemployed. We 
also study whether those permanently employed at t stay employed or change status to 
unemployed, investigating whether higher transition rates out of temporary employment 
are followed by lower transition rates out of permanent employment, and vice versa. 
A main focus in this article is to study whether those temporarily employed at 
t remain employed or have a higher probability of becoming unemployed at t+1. Turning 
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table 4  Binominal logistical regression of labor market transitions from permanent or temporary 
employment at t to still employed (=0) or unemployed (=1) at t+1: 2000–2007. 
 Permanently employed at t Temporary employed at t




(ref= means  
of odds)
b S.E. b S.E. b S.E. b S.E.
19–63
Denmark  0.477*** 0.029  0.479*** 0.032  0.194*** 0.044  0.201*** 0.048
Finland –0.102*** 0.031 –0.203*** 0.042  0.326*** 0.037  0.177*** 0.049
Norway –0.284*** 0.038 –0.113*** 0.047  –0.438*** 0.060 –0.224*** 0.071
Sweden –0.090*** 0.028 –0.163*** 0.030 –0.082** 0.038 –0.153*** 0.040
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08
N 234,691 25,477
25–54
Denmark  0.505*** 0.035  0.498*** 0.038  0.357*** 0.054  0.365*** 0.059
Finland –0.097*** 0.037 –0.187*** 0.050  0.323*** 0.047  0.162*** 0.063
Norway –0.271*** 0.046 –0.098*** 0.057  –0.553*** 0.080 –0.332*** 0.095
Sweden –0.137*** 0.034 –0.212*** 0.036 –0.127** 0.049 –0.194*** 0.051
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09
N 181,198 16,706
Note: The period for Denmark is 2000–2006. Significance probabilities for the coefficients: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. 
Controls regarding gender, age, educational level, area of origin, industry, occupation, and working time are conducted in 
model 1, while relative county unemployment levels and annual national changes in unemployment levels are also added 
in model 2. 
to these transitions for the whole group in Table 4, model 1, the probability of becoming 
unemployed is highest in Finland, followed by Denmark, with Sweden next, just below 
the Nordic mean. The probability is lowest in Norway, far below the Nordic mean. The 
results for those in the prime age are rather comparable, even though the probability of 
changing status to unemployed then are highest in Finland, with Denmark second. When 
controlling for labor market structures in model 2, the transition rate out of temporary 
employment is highest in Finland and then Denmark, while the probability is still the 
lowest in Norway. 
Studying both age groups, and controlling for all intervening factors except the labor 
market variables (model 1), Denmark also has the highest transition rates from perma-
nent employment to unemployment, while Norway has the lowest. Finland and Sweden 
have figures close to the Nordic average. When controlling for the relative unemployment 
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level and changes in the unemployment level the last year (model 2), the patterns change 
somewhat for individuals in their prime age. While the order is still the same, Norway 
now also has figures close to the Nordic mean. 
Integrating temporary workers—temporary employees’ probability 
of moving into permanent contracts
As temporary jobs are inferior regarding quality of working life, training, etc., integrat-
ing temporary employees into the labor market is not just about whether those holding 
such contracts stay employed, but also whether they move on to permanent contracts 
over time. We therefore also make a cross-national analysis of whether those tempo-
rarily employed at t, and still employed at t+1, are still temporarily employed or have 
moved on to a permanent contract at t+1 (Table 5). 
Both models in Table 5 show that for those staying employed from t to t+1, 
the probability of making a transition from temporary to permanent employment 
is highest in Norway, followed by Denmark. While the probability of such transi-
tions is higher than the Nordic mean in these countries, it is lower than the Nordic 
mean in Sweden and lowest in Finland. There are only minor differences between the 
whole group and those in their prime age. Most notable is the fact that the transition 
rate for the prime age group is almost the same in model 2 for Denmark and Norway. 
table 5  Binominal logistical regression of labor market transitions from temporary employment at t 
to temporary (0) or permanent (1) employment at t+1: 2000–2007. 
  Model 1 Model 2
Age group Country (ref= means of odds) b S.E. b S.E.
19–63
Denmark  0.339*** 0.029  0.327*** 0.031
Finland –0.743*** 0.024 –0.627*** 0.032
Norway  0.710*** 0.032  0.577*** 0.039
Sweden –0.306*** 0.023 –0.277*** 0.024
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.120
N 22,964
25–54 
Denmark  0.422*** 0.036  0.418*** 0.038
Finland –0.810*** 0.030 –0.667*** 0.039
Norway  0.632*** 0.040 0.459 0.049
Sweden –0.244*** 0.028 –0.210*** 0.029
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.137
N 15,115
Note: The period for Denmark is 2000–2006. Significance probabilities for the coefficients: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. 
Controls regarding gender, age, educational level, area of origin, industry, occupation, and working time are conducted in 
model 1, while relative county unemployment levels and annual national changes in unemployment levels are also added 
in model 2. 
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Summarizing the main cross-country results from Tables 3–5 in Table 6, the results 
show that Denmark, with a combination of lax regulation of both permanent and tem-
porary contracts, has the second highest transition rate into permanent employment, 
while having the highest transition rates into unemployment from both permanent 
and temporary employment. Denmark also has the second highest transition rate from 
temporary into permanent contracts. Norway, with a combination of strict regulation 
of both permanent and temporary contracts, has the highest transition rates from un-
employment into permanent employment, and the highest transition rates from tem-
porary to permanent employment. Further, the transition rates from permanent and 
temporary employment to unemployment is lowest in Norway, making the Norwegian 
model seem like an integrating, employee-friendly, labor market. In the other end, 
we find Sweden, with the highest transition rate from unemployment to temporary 
employment, and comparatively low (third) transition rates from temporary to perma-
nent contracts. While so, the transition rates out of permanent and temporary jobs are 
lower in Sweden than in Denmark and Finland, a result of the fact that the overall mo-
bility from employment to unemployment is comparatively low in Sweden (Berglund 
and Furåker, 2011: 125). Combined, the Swedish results indicate that such a model 
results in a layer of temporary employees who do not move into permanent jobs, 
while not experiencing lower job security. The Finnish results are rather comparable 
to the Swedish, albeit with even lower mobility rates from temporary to permanent 
contracts. 
discussion and conclusion
Investigating whether differences in permanent and temporary employment regulations 
make an impact on the transition patterns into the labor market for unemployed indi-
viduals, the results in this study show that unemployed individuals to a much higher 
extent enter the labor market through temporary rather than permanent contracts in 
Sweden and Finland, compared with Denmark and Norway, following the expectations 
in hypothesis 1. Berglund and Furåker (2011) show that the mobility rates from unem-
ployment into employment are highest in Norway, followed by Denmark. Therefore, the 
Nordic countries with the highest overall mobility into the labor market also have the 
highest share of transitions through permanent employment. Since temporary contracts 
table 6 Country rankings based on Tables 3–5, 19–63 years: model 2.
From unemployment to 
permanent rather than 
temporary contract
From temporary  
employment to  
unemployment
From permanent  
to unemployment
From temporary  
to permanent  
employment
Denmark 2 1 1 2
Finland 3 2 2 4
Norway 1 4 4 1
Sweden 4 3 3 3
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are known to be of inferior quality, we may speak of a higher degree of labor market seg-
mentation into the labor market in Sweden and Finland, combining strict regulation of 
permanent contracts with lax regulation of temporary contracts, than in Denmark and 
Norway, which does not. Regarding hypothesis 2, the Danish results follow the expecta-
tions. The risk of making a transition from temporary employment to unemployment is 
highest there, as the hiring risk is lower.
Different within-country studies have pointed to patterns of mobility from unem-
ployment to temporary or permanent employment, and further whether temporary em-
ployees stay employed and become integrated into permanent contracts. This compara-
tive study shows the relative difference in transition rates between the Nordic countries 
and pinpoints a much stronger tendency toward a segmented labor market in Finland 
and Sweden, with well-off permanent employees combined with a segment of tempo-
rary employees who are not integrated into permanent employment in the same degree 
as in Denmark and Norway. Gash (2008) found the strictest regulated country in her 
study, Germany, to integrate temporary employees into permanent contracts to a higher 
degree than Denmark, the UK, and France. The results here point in the same direction, 
with the strictest country with regard to permanent employment protection integrating 
temporary employees to a higher degree. While neoclassical economics assume that lax 
regulation of permanent and temporary contracts provides higher mobility and bet-
ter possibilities for permanent (insecure) employment, this article shows that Norway, 
a rather strictly regulated labor market, provides the highest probabilities for getting 
permanent (secure) rather than temporary employment. Further, we find that Norway 
shows the highest transition rates from temporary to permanent employment, followed 
by Denmark, with a lax and lax regulation. As such, proponents of deregulating into lax 
EPL are not supported by the results in this article. Instead, the results indicate that strict 
regulations are able to bring unemployed individuals into the labor market through safe, 
permanent employment contracts. 
While deregulation through laxer regulation of temporary contracts has been put 
forward as a way to deregulate labor markets while keeping the jobs of insiders secure, 
the transition patterns in the lax model (Denmark) come out with the “second best” 
results, as the transition rate from unemployment into temporary employment is better 
than in Sweden and Finland, and while the transition rate from temporary employment 
to unemployment is high in Denmark, those who stay employed move into permanent 
contracts. Therefore, this study indicates that when discussing labor market integration, 
regulation of the labor market in a strict or a lax mode may function better than deregu-
lating through laxer regulations of temporary contracts. Further, the proponents of lax 
regulation of temporary contracts claim that temporary contracts have a redeeming effect 
in providing a bridge into the labor market. This claim is not supported by the results in 
this study, as temporary employees are becoming unemployed to a higher degree in Swe-
den and Finland than in Norway. While one indicator of the labor market integration of 
temporary employees is whether or not temporary employees become unemployed over 
time, moving from temporary to permanent contracts is another indicator. The transition 
rates from temporary to permanent employment contracts are lowest in Finland and 
Sweden, contrary to expectations by proponents of lax temporary employment regula-
tion. It seems as though unemployed individuals in these labor markets to a larger extent 
become employed in secondary, temporary positions that it is difficult to move away 
from, pointing toward labor market segmentation, thus supporting hypothesis 2b. 
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What can explain these clear differences in transition patterns in and out of the 
labor market? While the lax regulation of permanent contracts in the Danish labor 
market may provide companies with numerical flexibility, reducing the need for an in-
ternal, secondary group of employees with temporary contracts, the strict permanent 
regulation coupled with rather lax regulation of temporary employees seen in Finland 
and Sweden may have bred the ground for an insider–outsider labor market, where em-
ployers to a higher degree find it suitable to organize their numerical flexibility through 
a secondary group of temporary employees, in line with the ideas of Atkinson (1984). 
If so, this type of flexibility should perhaps have materialized itself in higher transi-
tion rates into unemployment, which could have been expected if this were the case. In 
Norway, the strict rules limit the possibilities of using temporary employees in order to 
enhance numerical flexibility, also at least partly explaining the low transition rates from 
temporary contracts to further temporary contracts or unemployment. Further, the strict 
regulation of permanent employment combined with the limited possibilities of using 
temporary employees may also explain the high level of transitions from temporary to 
permanent employment contracts in Norway. Since the hiring risks increase when per-
manent contracts are strictly regulated, the temporary contracts may to a higher degree 
than in the other countries function as a screening device, where temporary positions 
de facto function as a probationary contract before the employee is hired permanently. 
While such use is strictly regulated, and difficult to orchestrate by the employer when 
initiating a temporary employment contract, in positions where temporary employees 
substitute for employees on maternity leave or in other temporary positions within the 
same company, the employee holding the position permanently sometimes does not re-
turn. In such cases, the temporary employee holding the position may be permanently 
employed. Further, as there are relatively few temporary positions in Norway, this might 
also increase the likelihood of making a transition into a permanent position in itself. 
We have controlled for unemployment levels and changes in unemployment levels, 
and tried to rule out the effect of institutional differences regarding labor market transi-
tions among young and those heading toward retirement by also studying the individu-
als in their prime age as a group. Such explanations can therefore mostly be ruled as. 
Still, while it is possible that the Norwegian mix between strict permanent and strict 
temporary employment regulation does not lead to labor market segmentation, it is 
possible that the extraordinary high employment rates and low unemployment level in 
Norway at the time of the study, with close to full employment, reduced the chance of 
labor market segmentation. It could be that the control used does not remove the full 
impact of the economic boom in the Norwegian labor market. Still, Skollerud (1997) 
found a high degree of transitions from temporary to permanent employment also dur-
ing the economic downturn in Norway during 1989–1993, indicating that the finding 
is not just an effect of high labor demand. In addition, while there are clear differences 
in transition patterns from one year to the next, it could be that the low transition pat-
tern from temporary to permanent employment may change somewhat if studied over a 
longer time span than was available to us. 
The consequences of EPL per se could not be measured directly, hence the results 
may be influenced by differences in the UB system or in the way dismissals and hiring 
of temporary employees are handled at the company level. While such measurement er-
rors cannot be ruled out, the results in the study are robust, as they all point in the same 
direction, away from the idea that a combination of strict permanent and lax temporary 
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regulation may integrate unemployed and temporary workers in the labor market and 
away from the neoclassical idea of lax regulation as the way to integrate unemployed 
and temporary employees. 
Since the years 2000–2006, the Nordic countries have faced a financial crisis, fol-
lowed by economic turbulence and lower economic growth. While the impact of the 
crisis has varied between the Nordic countries (Jochem, 2011; Mjøset, 2011), a topic 
for further studies would be to investigate whether the consequences of differences in 
regulations, and the transition patterns observed, are different during periods with low 
or no economic growth. 
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end notes
1  In 2004, the duration was reduced from 36 to 24 months.
2  The table was slightly changed April 2013 due to mistakes during the layout process. The table origi-
nally published partially consisted of three models, which was confusing and not intended. The change 
does not influence the content of the article in any way. 
